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The purpose of this paper is to propose and consider a rationalist account of the effects of virtual 
experiences, such as engaging in simulated acts of violence in video games. This descriptive account 
will be based on sound principles for case-based reasoning, or what I will refer to as case-norm-case 
casuistics, and it is put forward as an alternative to emotivist explanations of the effects of virtual 
violence. Instead of asking how virtual violence might lead to changes in our moral intuitions, the 
proposed account asks how virtual violence might lead to changes in our moral reasoning. The 
controversial notion of ‘virtual rape’ will be used as an example of how the two accounts ask 
fundamentally different questions and how the proposed account can yield an increased understanding 
of how experiences in virtual environments can change our moral norms. Prior to outlining the basics 
of this account and the issue of virtual rape in particular, I will outline some of the problems with 
emotivist claims about the effects of virtual violence, especially insofar as these claims rely on 








Do we reach moral judgments on the basis of conscious rational deliberation or non-conscious 
intuitions? This age-old question, sometimes described in terms of emotivist versus rationalist theories 
of moral judgment, has been subject to heated debate in philosophy, psychology and other disciplines. 
It lies at the heart of ethics in the sense that moral rules and principles seem redundant if our 
judgments are primarily dictated by more or less instinctive intuitions. Whether or not we subscribe to 
a rationalist or emotivist theory of moral judgment also determines how we approach a number of 
other problems. For instance, how might our judgments change as a result of engaging in or being 
exposed to virtual violence. By ‘virtual violence’ I mean engaging in acts of simulated violence in 
interactive computer-mediated environments. A typical case would be a video game in which you 
witness or perform simulated acts of murder, torture or rape – or if a representation of you (your 
avatar) is being the victim of such acts. If our moral judgments are primarily motivated by our 
intuitions, the crucial question becomes: how might our intuitions change as a result of virtual 
violence? If our judgments are primarily motivated by reason, the crucial question becomes: how 
might our reasoning change as a result of virtual violence? The vast majority of claims regarding the 
effects of virtual violence, especially as put forward in the media and by politicians, seem to take for 
granted that virtual violence changes our intuitions, and rational deliberation is left out of the picture. 
In this paper I will instead consider the effects of virtual violence from within a rationalist framework. 
That is, rather than asking how virtual violence changes our intuitions, I will focus on how virtual 
violence might change our moral reasoning. One reason for proposing this alternative account is that 
emotivist accounts, when they do not amount to mere speculation, often rest upon ethically and 
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methodologically problematic experiments. As a model for moral reasoning, I will focus on casuistics, 
or principles for sound case-based reasoning, as a descriptive model. Thus, the purpose of this paper is 
to give an account how virtual violence – ‘virtual rape’ in particular – can change our moral judgments 
in light of a rationalist, casuistic model of moral judgment. Before turning to the outline of casuistics 
as a rationalist, descriptive theory of moral reasoning and how it can be applied to virtual rape, I will 
start by describing some problems with emotivist, empirically based claims about the effects of virtual 
violence. 
 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH EMOTIVIST CLAIMS ABOUT THE EFFECTS 
OF VIRTUAL VIOLENCE 
If our moral judgments result from more or less unconscious, instinctive intuitions, it is difficult to 
answer questions regarding the effects of virtual violence in any other way than by external 
observation – such as experiments and surveys. These studies are subject to a number of common 
methodological and ethical problems, however: 
  
· Correlation is not causation: In some studies, a significant correlation has been found 
between violent behaviour and playing video games (cf. Anderson and Dill 2000). This kind of 
correlation has also been emphasized by the media with regard to both the Virginia Tech. and 
Columbine tragedies. One of the biggest, although perhaps overstated, problems in psychological 
experiments is of course that correlation does not imply causation. If we acknowledge that there is a 
correlation, this correlation can be due to 1) both playing violent games and being a violent person 
could stem from a shared cause, or 2) being a violent person in the first place might lead to playing 
more violent video games, not the other way around. 
· Expectancy effects: It is difficult to conceal the purpose of these experiments. If a subject is 
exposed to virtual violence and is then placed in a room in which it is possible to display acts of 
violence, he or she can easily figure out the purpose of the experiment and act in strict accordance or 
opposition to what is believed to be the researchers’ hypothesis. 
· Intervening experiences: Since experiments on virtual violence must assume that these 
experiences only constitute one part of the picture, it becomes extremely difficult to conduct 
longitudinal studies due to the multitude of intervening experiences. Thus, most experiments seem to 
rely on short-term effects only, as for instance in the famous Bandura experiments in the 1960s 
(Bandura, Ross and Ross 1961). 
· Ethical problems: If there is a risk that being exposed to virtual violence can lead to 
dramatic changes in behaviour, then it might be questioned whether these experiments can be ethically 
justified in the first place.  
 
It is not my purpose in this paper to argue that experiments dealing with the effects of virtual violence 
are necessarily flawed, but only to point out that the number of methodological and ethical problems, 
combined with the implicit dependence upon emotivist accounts of moral judgment, warrants 
consideration of alternative models for evaluating the effects of virtual violence.1 
 
CASUISTICS AS DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
One reason why it is difficult to propose descriptive, rationalist accounts of the formation of moral 
judgment is that there is no one way in which all persons reason. Thus, I will restrict myself to one 
method of reasoning and try to show how that kind of reasoning is affected by different factors. For 
the sake of the argument, I will more or less take for granted that one influential way of reasoning 
about moral problems is sound case-based reasoning – or what is sometimes known as casuistics. 
Thus, I will use casuistics as a descriptive model, i.e. a model which aims to describe, rather than 
prescribe, the formation of moral judgments. Some will argue that a descriptive casuistic model, 
                                                  
1
 It should be mentioned that Craig A. Anderson has done much to show the methodological validity of these kinds of 
experiments. See http://www.apa.org/science/psa/sb-anderson.html for an overview and further references. 
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especially one that builds on sound principles for case-based reasoning, is overly optimistic and 
presents an idealized version of moral judgment not found in most persons. Although this is probably 
true in many cases, my claim does not entail that all people form moral judgments in this manner. The 
condition is merely that we can act in such a manner and that some people do, some of the time. 2 If 
this is the case, it is worth considering how moral judgments might be altered by a process of informed 
reasoning over new experiences and paradigmatic cases.  
   ‘Casuistics’ is a generic term that covers different forms of case-based reasoning. Central to 
casuistics is the use of paradigmatic cases as a starting point. In short, a morally problematic case is 
compared to morally unproblematic cases, and the ethically relevant similarities are analyzed in order 
to figure out whether the judgment of the paradigmatic case is valid also for the problematic case. To 
use abortion as an example, the moral justification of such an act can be analyzed in terms of its 
similarities with cases in which most reasonable persons would agree that killing a living being is 
justifiable and cases in which it is not. By weighing the relevant similarities and differences against 
each other, we can come to a more informed decision regarding the ethical justification of abortion. 
   The advantage with casuistics is its ability to take a range of situational factors into consideration, 
thereby avoiding the rigidity of universal principles. Since the paradigmatic case should ideally be 
agreed upon from the perspective of any ethical theory, as well as different religious backgrounds, it 
can also be seen as a promising means of reaching agreement across cultural, political and religious 
divides. As long as we agree upon the paradigmatic case and the principles for sound case-based 
reasoning, the discussion can focus on ethically relevant properties rather than abstract ethical theories 
or more or less non-rational worldviews. One of its main problems is that it can be difficult to find 
paradigmatic cases – cases upon which most reasonable persons are likely to agree. After all, 
reasonable persons disagree on a number of things. Another problem is to discern which properties are 
(most) ethically relevant and to what degree these properties are shared by the problematic case at 
hand.  
   Furthermore, there are two main forms of casuistry, case-to-case and case-norm-case.3 In case-to-
case reasoning, we choose one or more paradigmatic cases with which the case at hand is compared. 
In case-norm-case reasoning, moral norms are established on the basis of an inductive inference from 
paradigmatic cases, and the application of these norms is done on the basis of deduction from the 
general norm to the case at hand. ‘Inference’ and ‘deduction’ is not to be taken in a strict logical sense, 
but rather in accordance to the various principles for sound reasoning (see below). In this sense, the 
case-norm-case approach has much in common with John Rawls’ reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971), 
where cases and norms are reflected upon and revised in light of each other. Although the case-to-case 
and case-norm-case models have much in common, the main difference is that the use of norms as an 
intermediary can foster the method of reflective equilibrium and requires coherency between a larger 
set of cases than in case-to-case reasoning. 
   What the different forms of casuistry has in common, at least as a normative model, is a set of rules 
and principles for how to extend moral judgment between cases and/or norms. The overarching 
principle is what is sometimes known as the principle of formal equality, which can be formulated as 
follows: Cases that are relevantly similar should be treated (or judged) in a similar manner; a 
differential treatment requires a relevant difference (cf. Thommessen and Wetlesen 2003:242). The 
relevant difference in question is a difference in the set of ethically relevant properties. Thus, sound 
case-based reasoning entails 1) find paradigmatic cases with which the case at hand can be compared, 
2) discern the ethically relevant properties in the paradigmatic case, and 3) analyze whether these 
                                                  
2 Incidentally, Jonson and Toulmin mention that the reason for attempting to revive casuistry in The Abuse of Casuistry was 
because they realized that they were already thinking in casuistic terms; They ‘were independently struck by aspects of [their 
previous] methods and results that were hard to account for in terms of current ethical theory’ (1988:vii). It should also be 
mentioned that casuistics occupy a central role in computer ethics, as reflected in the oft-cited definition of computer ethics by 
James Moor: ‘A typical problem in computer ethics arises because there is a policy vacuum about how computer technology 
should be used’ (Moor 1985:266).  
3
 We can also add norm-to-case as a third form of casuistry, although this model strictly speaking amounts to a mere deduction 
from principles, and should perhaps be seen as a merely descriptive model of what happens when paradigmatic, moral norms are 
taken to be a priori and dogmatic (cf. Thommessen and Wetlesen 2003:247). 
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properties can be found in the problematic case at hand. If we take animal ethics, for instance, we can 
argue as follows: 1) All reasonable persons agree that it is prima facie wrong to willingly inflict pain 
on another human being, 2) the ethically relevant property in the paradigmatic case is sentience, i.e. 
the ability to feel pain,4 and 3) we have good reasons to believe that a horse is capable of feeling pain 
(due to having a similar central nervous system and pain-like behaviour). Hence, sentience is a 
sufficient, if not necessary, condition for extending our moral judgment from the paradigmatic case 
(humans) to the case at hand (horses). In other words, there is not an ethically relevant difference 
between humans and horses when it comes to inflicting pain.5 In reaching this conclusion, we can then 
form or revise our moral norms in light of that judgment. For instance, the resulting norm would be 
that, prima facie, it is morally wrong to cause pain to any being that is likely to be sentient. Judgment 
regarding other problematic cases can then lead us to further revise and refine that moral norm, for 
instance in cases such as embryos, animals with no central nervous systems, humans with Congenital 
Insensitivity to Pain with Anhidrosis (CIPA) syndrome and so forth. 
   Perhaps the most central aspect of casuistry, and what separates sound casuistry from its abuse, is 
the requirement that we cannot reach any conclusion we want simply by focusing on the properties 
that are conducive to the conclusion we wish to reach. I believe this can be emphasized by relating 
casuistry more closely to discourse ethics, and require it to be twice intersubjective. That is, we take 
cases upon which most reasonable persons would agree as a starting point, and our arguments 
concerning the ethically relevant similarities between this case and the case at hand must make sense 
to any reasonable person – beyond non-rational beliefs.
6
 Thus, the starting point and ultimate guiding 
principle ought to be agreement among reasonable and well-informed persons. This restricts the 
ethically relevant properties to empirical and theoretical notions. For instance, with regard to the 
difference between an embryo and an adult human being, lack of central nervous system (empirical) 
and lack of consciousness (theoretical, i.e. inferred from empirical data) can be ethically relevant. So 
can ‘being a living entity’, but not e.g. the belief that an embryo is God’s creature from the inception 
(cf. Thommessen and Wetlesen 2003:243). 
   As can be seen from the examples above, casuistry is not a direct route to certainty, but at the very 
least it allows us to focus on the important questions, and it provides a common platform for 
discussion. As a descriptive model, it can help us understand how we might come to change our moral 
norms in light of being confronted with new experiences. I will now turn to how our moral norms can 
be revised in light of experiencing virtual violence, and I will focus on the controversial notion of 
‘virtual rape’ and its possible impact on moral norms regarding rape in general. 
 
WHAT IS A ‘VIRTUAL RAPE’? 
In a much-debated 1993 paper, Julian Dibbell describes what is commonly known as the first example 
of a virtual rape.7 The event is difficult to comprehend unless one is familiar with different kinds of 
virtual environments. Indeed, it is difficult to describe without invoking real life metaphors and 
judgments. Dibbell describes his initial reaction to the phenomenon: 
                                                  
4 Sentience is Peter Singer’s criterion in arguing that animals should be ascribed a similar moral status as that of humans (Singer 
1990). 
5 This similarity entails that it is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on horses, but it does not prevent us from having a hierarchy in 
which this is less wrong than inflicting pain on a human being. See Wetlesen (1999) and Søraker (2006) for two theories of moral 
status in which beings are ascribed a differing moral status in light of their relevant similarities with moral persons. 
6 Please note that by non-rational I mean beliefs that cannot be verified by or grounded in empirical data. Non-rationality, in 
contrast with irrationality, is not necessarily inconsistent with reason. Thus, although I see religious beliefs and various forms of 
superstition as non-rational in this sense, this does not entail that they are irrational or necessarily that they ought to be excluded 
from our value systems. Such beliefs cannot, however, provide the basis for sound, case-based reasoning; History has taught us 
that mere beliefs about differences between classes can have disastrous effects and, indeed, is the reason why casuistry fell into 
disrepute in the first place. 
7
 Due to constraints on space, I will not go into details on how the virtual rape took place, but refer the interested reader to 
Dibbell’s work which explains it in both technical and metaphorical terms. Notice especially the importance of the ‘voodoo doll’ 




I was still the rankest of newbies then … still too unsteady to make the leaps of faith, logic, 
and empathy required to meet the spectacle on its own terms. I was fascinated by the concept 
of virtual rape, but I couldn't quite take it seriously. (Dibbell 1993)8 
 
But, when Dibbell describes the personas and the actions that happened in a virtual world called 
LambdaMoo one night, it soon becomes clear that the differences and, albeit weak, similarities 
between a virtual and a real rape cuts to the very essence of what it is – and might become – to 
immerse oneself in virtual reality. The main details are roughly as follows. In a virtual environment, 
the inhabitants are represented by avatars, i.e. graphical representations through which the participants 
act, speak and portray more or less consistent identities. Some avatar-mediated actions resemble real 
life actions, whereas others clearly do not. For instance, real-world murder is completely different 
from virtual murder, but a heinous insult in the real world is not completely different from a heinous 
insult in the virtual. A virtual rape entails that someone takes control over your avatar, the 
representation of you in virtual reality, and forces your avatar to engage in acts that you never would 
consent to. In particular, this includes extreme forms of self-mutilation and sexual activities. The 
avatar, which you normally use to channel speech and actions according to how you wish to present 
yourself, is forced into doing these activities while you, and all bystanders, witness the events 
helplessly. To someone unfamiliar with virtual reality and presenting yourself via an avatar, this might 
seem like a trivial affair. The problem is that the degree in which you are related to your avatar is 
highly subjective, ranging from casual detachment to a complete blurring of oneself and one’s 
representation. In order to understand how such actions can be interpreted as equivalent to rape, keep 
in mind that some individuals dedicate the majority of their social life to online role playing, that they 
have invested many years in creating a consistent, trustworthy and virtuous character in order to 
overcome the lack of physical presence, and that all of those efforts can be annihilated by one single 
instance of having one’s avatar commit the unspeakable acts in question. Keep also in mind that these 
forced acts are witnessed by your closest friends and that there is often no way in which to submit 
proof that you were in fact under the control of someone else.9 Your name is damaged for always; 
trust and friendships dissolve.  
   When the events that Dibbell describes occurred, there was no ready-made concept to explain these 
events and the corresponding feelings. The concept ‘virtual rape’ was neither coined in hindsight nor 
established beforehand.10 What made it a virtual rape was simply that the victim and bystanders 
spontaneously experienced it as if it was a rape. It was an attempt to find some real life concept that 
could give meaning to why the main victims and the spectators found themselves shocked and 
overwhelmed by their own reactions (Dibbell 1993). Neither was the use of the concept ‘rape’ a result 
of one person’s over-reaction, since a near unanimous group of spectators found no better word to 
describe what happened. The main victim of the Dibbell case described that as she was trying to make 
sense of what had happened ‘posttraumatic tears were streaming down her face – a real-life fact that 
should suffice to prove that the words' emotional content was no mere playacting’ (Dibbell 1993). 
 
A CASUISTIC ACCOUNT OF ‘VIRTUAL RAPE’ 
One problem with subjecting these events to case-based reasoning is that it is difficult to find real life 
cases that are similar, let alone paradigmatic ones. The main reason is that most cases in which rape is 
widely acknowledged as such involve some form of bodily violation, which seemingly excludes virtual 
experiences by definition. Whether or not ‘rape’ can be applied to virtual experiences, then, seems to 
rely on whether or not bodily violation is a necessary or sufficient condition for something being a 
                                                  
8 There is no pagination in the original. Dibbell later notes: ‘Where before I'd found it hard to take virtual rape seriously, I now 
was finding it difficult to remember how I could ever not have taken it seriously’. 
9
 Although many find it tempting to point out that living the majority of your life online and having only online friends is 
unhealthy in itself, this does not remove, neither should it devalue, the emotional distress caused by such events.  
10
 In this sense, ‘virtual rape’ does not entirely fit into Philip Brey’s Searle-inspired definition of an ’ontological representation of 
an institutional entity’ in which there is a consensus that X counts as Y (in context C). See Brey (2003). 
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rape. This is the question that Dibbell’s case prompts in the proposed rationalist, casuistic account of 
moral reasoning.  
   The special and problematic thing about rape is that the mindset of the parties involved makes a 
crucial difference; the exact same act can be both wanted and unwanted. If we do not consider the 
mindset and consent of the parties involved, there is in some cases no way in which to ascertain 
whether it is a rape or not. This is of course the reason why rape, unfortunately, is one of the most 
difficult cases to prove in court. Any kind of physical act can be consensual and desired. Likewise, we 
cannot claim that experiencing something as a rape is sufficient or necessary for calling it a rape; how 
we experience something is highly subjective and can be altered by drugs or past experiences. Thus, 
there seem to be no conditions that in themselves are sufficient for something to be a rape. The crucial 
question then becomes whether there are any necessary conditions. In case-norm-case casuistics, this 
is where we encounter a reflective equilibrium between the case at hand and our moral norms. If we 
hold that ‘virtual rape’ is not a (minor) form of rape, we indirectly assume that some kind of bodily 
violation is a necessary requirement for judging something to be a rape. If we do hold that ‘virtual 
rape’ is a (minor) form of rape, we indirectly assume that some kind of bodily violation is not a 
necessary requirement for judging something to be a rape. Thereby, if we are to act consistently and 
revise our moral norms in accordance with the case at hand, we would need to revise our moral norms 
regarding rape so as to either exclude or include instances of ‘rape’ where no bodily violation takes 
place. We are then left with either a more exclusive or inclusive notion of rape that carries over into 
real life judgments. The conclusion might be the same as an emotivist account, but the explanations are 
radically different: 
 
· Possible emotivist explanations: If our moral norm regarding rape becomes more inclusive 
due to experiencing virtual rape, this is due to being made more emotionally aware of rape-like acts. If 
our moral norm regarding rape becomes more exclusive, this is due to a desensitisation of our 
emotions regarding rape-like acts. 
· Possible rationalist, casuistic explanation: If our moral norm regarding rape becomes more 
inclusive, this is due to rationally recognizing that bodily violation is not a necessary requirement for 
something to be a rape. If our moral norm regarding rape becomes more exclusive, this is due to 
rationally recognizing that bodily violation is necessary for something to be a rape. 
 
It is not my concern to prescribe which conclusion we ought to reach; the main lesson is that the two 
accounts lead to radically different questions and explanations. On an emotivist account, the question 
is: in what way are your feelings or intuitions regarding rape altered by experiencing virtual rape? On 
a rationalist, casuistic account, the question becomes, for instance: do you regard bodily violation as a 
necessary requirement for something to be a rape? The former, especially if we regard intuition as an 
instinctive and unconscious source of moral judgments, can primarily be answered by ethically and 
methodologically problematic studies. The latter can be addressed by internal or external deliberation. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The rationalist, casuistic account of the effects of virtual violence allows us to ask a different set of 
questions than emotivist accounts. Rather than asking how our moral intuitions are changed, the 
question becomes how our moral reasoning changes. That is, personal experiences and paradigmatic 
cases are seen as providing new factors to take into consideration when deliberating over our moral 
norms. Although I have focussed on ‘virtual rape’ and only given a rough overview of how such a 
model can be applied, I believe that more research should be done on how these questions can be 
answered within rationalist frameworks. Such models underline that there is no deterministic relation 
between virtual violence and immoral behaviour – and that our moral judgments can be altered by 
other means than emotional distress, trauma, desensitisation and the like. That is, even if we fashion 
ourselves as immune to any moral detriment from virtual violence, our moral judgments can still be 
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